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DIVORCE RECOGNITION-A TWO HEADED MONSTER: 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND DUE PROCESS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The law of recognition of interstate divorce is dominated by 
nineteenth century concepts of an agriculturally oriented, immobile 
society that attached a certain stigma to the breaking up of the 
family unit through divorce. Society has liberalized its attitude 
toward divorce in this century, believing that the law should not force 
people to live together against their will under tensions often more 
damaging to children than actual separation of the parents. The 
twentieth century has also fostered a mobile society where people 
are capable of changing residences a thousand miles in a matter of 
hours. Thus separation of the spouses into different states preceding 
divorce is not an uncommon occurrence, nor is the practice of leav-
ing the state of matrimonial domicil to obtain a divorce due to the 
limited grounds available in that state. Often divorces procured in 
this situation are ex parte in nature, the absent spouse being notified 
by mail or by publicaion. In other cases, by prior agreement of the 
parties the absent spouse retains an attorney in the forum state to 
enter an appearance and admit allegations as to the complaining 
spouse's domicil and often to admit the grounds for divorce. Against 
this background, Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented on the usual 
situation in the divorce court where the parties and their attorneys 
engage in conduct that "in any other type of litigation, would be 
regarded as perjury, but which is not so regarded where divorce is 
involved because ladies and gentlemen indulge in it."1 
The breaking up of the marriage of two people often has 
ramifications far exceeding the marital status of the spouses. Children 
are affected, as are property rights and future heirs. As with any situa-
tion that affects the well-being of its residents, the state of matri-
monial domicil is deeply concerned with an orderly marital 
termination that to some extent permanently settles the rights and 
duties of the parties. Uncertainty in recognition of the dissolution of 
a marriage upsets the interest of the state and can have the effect of 
illegitimatizing children, causing annulment of subsequent mar-
riages, and causing problems in the distribution of property upon 
the death of one of the parties. 
A not totally unrealistic hypothetical situation will serve to 
1 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 367 (1948) (dissenting opinion). 
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focus the issues. H and W were happily married residents of State A 
for ten years. They had two children and H had been successful in 
acquiring a substantial estate. For a variety of reasons, the marital 
relationship deteriorated to a point where H and fV saw that no 
useful purpose would be served by continuing to live together. H 
went to an attorney and was told that there were no grounds for 
divorce in State A but that State B had very liberal divorce laws and 
that he should have no trouble procuring a divorce there. H traveled 
to State B, resided there for the necessary period, filed for divorce 
and had W served by mail. W was perfectly willing to let H obtain a 
divorce, since they had previously agreed to a divorce and had 
worked out a property settlement agreeable to both, and did not 
enter an appearance. H obtained the divorce uncontested and 
returned to State A whereupon he immediately married D. Hand 
D had one child before H died without executing a will. W, finding 
her property settlement to be less attractive upon learning the ex-
tent of H' s estate, brought an action to have H' s second marriage 
declared null and void and also to have H and W's marriage de-
clared to be still existent since H had never established a domicil in 
State B and therefore the purported divorce was of no validity in 
State A. 
The competing interests in the above situation are not easily 
measured. State A has an interest in preserving the integrity of the 
marital status of its domiciliaries. The marriage of H and W and H 
and D were solemnized in State A; therefore, by general principles of 
conflicts of law, the validity of each marriage is determined by the 
law of State A.2 State A was also the domicil of H, and therefore 
the law of State A will determine the ultimate distribution of H's 
estate. 
Competing against State A's interest in protecting its domicil-
iaries from having their marital status determined by an ex parte 
divorce procured in a sister state is the interest of all states in protect-
ing the integrity of judgments rendered in one state from collateral 
attack in another state. Also competing against the interest of State 
A is the desire to achieve certainty and finality in divorce cases so 
as to avoid the situation described above. Once the legal status of the 
parties has been finalized in one state, the parties should feel secure 
and free to remarry in another state. Any solution to the problem 
must take into account these factors. 
A solution to the problem of the extra-territorial effect of 
2 H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 228 (4th ed. Scoles 1964). 
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divorce must also meet the requirements of the United States Con-
stitution. The Constitution requires that "Full faith and Credit in 
each State shall be given to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial 
Proceedings of every other State."3 The due process clause of the 
Constitution requires the forum state to have jurisdiction of the 
subject mater in order for its judgments to have validity outside as 
well as within the forum state. Further, due process requires con-
tacts with the forum state in order to validly bind a defendant who 
is not personally served in the state and who otherwise does not 
voluntarily enter a general appearance. 
II. THE BEGINNING--THE WILLIAMS CASES 
Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix were both resident domi-
ciliaries of North Carolina. They left their spouses and went to 
Nevada where they resided for the necessary si.'{ weeks and procured 
ex parte divorces against their absent consorts, based upon con-
structive service. A decree of divorce was granted to both parties, 
the court finding in each case 
[T]he plaintiff has been and now is a bona fide and contin-
uous resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada, and had 
been such resident for more than six weeks immediately preceed-
ing the commencement of this action in the manner prescribed 
by law.4 
Immediately thereafter, Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix mar-
ried each other in Nevada and returned to live together in North 
Carolina. Soon they were indicted on a charge of bigamous cohabita-
tion, and both pleaded not guilty. As a defense, they offered in 
evidence copies of the Nevada proceedings and claimed that the 
divorce decrees and marriage in Nevada were valid in North 
Carolina. They were convicted, and the judgment of conviction was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.5 The state con-
tended that since neither of the original spouses were served in 
Nevada, nor entered an appearance therein, the Nevada decree 
would not be recognized in North Carolina. The state also con-
tended that the defendants had gone to Nevada for the sole purpose 
of obtaining a divorce, not to establish a bona fide residence. For 
these reasons, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that North 
Carolina was not required to recognize the Nevada decree under 
8 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
4 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 290 (1942). 
li 220 N.C. 455, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941). 
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the full faith and credit clause of the constitution. On certiorari to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, the conviction was reversed 
and remanded. 6 
The decision in the first William case represented a major 
change in the law applicable to the recognition of out-of-state 
divorces. The decision reflected a change in attitude on the part of 
the Court as to the interests that should be protected when determin-
ing the validity of a divorce procured in one state against a domi-
ciliary of another state. Prior to the first Williams case, the Supreme 
Court had primarily concerned itself with the interest of the states 
in protecting their domiciliaries against ex parte divorces obtained 
in another state. The Court was less concerned with the possibility 
that a person might be validly divorced in one state, yet remain 
legally married in another state. In Haddock v. Haddock7 the 
Supreme Court had held that a state is not required to give full 
faith and credit to a divorce upon constructive service rendered in 
another state unless the forum state was both the domicil of one of 
the parties and also the matrimonial domicil of the marriage, or 
unless the forum state's decision was based upon personal service 
on the non-resident spouse. Previous to the Haddock case, the 
Supreme Court had held that a decree in favor of a party in his 
domicil, which was also the domicil of the other spouse until the 
time Of separation, was entitled to full faith and credit, at least 
when the facts negatived the right of the defendant spouse to acquire 
a separate domicil. 8 This was true despite the facts that the decree 
was rendered upon constructive or substituted service and the absent 
spouse made no appearance. Thus the court had adopted what 
became known as the "fault doctrine," that is, a divorce obtained by 
constructive or substituted service was not entitled to full faith and 
credit when the party "at fault" obtained a divorce outside the 
matrimonial domicil despite a finding that the party obtaining the 
divorce was domiciled in the state rendering the decree. 
The Haddock case created much uncertainty as to whether a 
divorce obtained in one state would be entitled to full faith and 
credit and reflected an attitude on the part of the Supreme Court to 
6 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) [hereinafter referred to in text 
as the first Williams case]. 
7 201 u.s. 562 (1906). 
8 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). The court of appeals of New York 
had affirmed a divorce brought by the wife, refusing to recognize a decree of divorce 
obtained by the husband in Kentucky upon constructive service, despite a finding in 
the New York court that Kentucky was the matrimonial domicil of the parties. 
Ø»·²Ñ²´·²» óó íð Ñ¸·± Í¬ò ÔòÖò íïë ïçêç
1969] COMMENT 315 
protect the resident spouse at the expense of uniformity. However, 
with the decision in the first Williams case, the Court eliminated 
any requirement for a divorce to be entitled to full faith and credit, 
aside from procedural due process and the necessity for one of the 
spouses to be domiciled in the forum state. Even before the decision 
in the Haddock case, the Court had stated that in order to have 
jurisdiction in a divorce suit, one of the parties had to be domiciled 
in that state.0 The first Williams case decided that domicil of one 
of the parties alone, without more, was sufficient to entitle a decree 
to full faith and credit. No longer was it necessary to locate the 
matrimonial domicil or determine which party was at fault, and the 
Haddock case was specifically overruled.10 
But Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix's story did not end with 
the decision in the first Williams case. After the decision, the parties 
were again tried for bigamous cohabitation. This time the North 
Carolina courts found the defendants were not domiciled in Nevada 
at the time the divorce decrees were rendered. Therefore, the North 
Carolina courts found that the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction of 
the subject matter to render the decrees, and as a result, the divorces 
were not entitled to full faith and credit. The defendants appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, but this time the court 
affirmed the conviction.11 Whether it was under a due process theory 
or an exception to the full faith and credit requirement, the court 
held that North Carolina could inquire into the jurisdiction of the 
Nevada court to render the judgment, and in divorce cases domicil 
of one of the parties is essential to jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for the majority, stated: 
[T]he decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything 
except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and 
domicil is a jurisdictional fact. To permit the necessary finding 
of domicil by one State to foreclose all States in the protection 
of their social institutions would be intolerable.l2 
Thus the decision in the second Williams case represents a step 
backward from the first Williams case, and once again raises un-
certainty as to the validity of migratory divorces. Nevertheless, the 
court somewhat limited the uncertainty when it held that the burden 
9 Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Stteitwolf v. Sttietwo1f, 181 U.S. 179 (1901). 
10 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 293 (1942). 
11 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) [hereinafter referred to in text 
as the second Williams case]. 
12 325 u.s. 226, 232. 
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of proof in attacking the finding of domicil rests upon the party 
attacking the validity of the divorce.18 
The decisions in both the first and second Williams cases begin 
with the assumption that domicil of one of the parties is necessary 
in order for a state to render a decree of divorce.14 The requirement 
of domicil of one of the parties to establish jurisdiction is a product 
of the idea that a divorce proceeding is in the nature of an action 
in rem.15 The marital relationship is the res and follows the domicil 
of the parties. Thus the res can be located in two different places if 
the parties have separated and have established domicils independent 
of each other. Since the domicil of one of the parties in the forum 
state provided the res, the court may proceed to dissolve the marital 
relationship without in personam jurisdiction over an absent spouse. 
The characterization of a divorce proceeding as an action in rem 
eliminates much of the hardship that would necessarily result if 
the court were required to have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant in order to render a valid decree. Obviously, the state has 
an interest in dissolving the marital status of one of its residents 
when the absent spouse has left the jurisdiction to whereabouts 
unknown. It would be an extreme hardship in many cases to saddle 
a spouse forever with the marriage relationship simply because the 
absent spouse had left the state and to require the resident spouse 
to journey to another state where the spouse can be personally 
served in order to terminate the marriage. 
The problem, of course, is that in selecting domicil as the nexus 
13 325 U.S. 226, 233-234. The Court said: "The fact that the Nevada court found 
that they were domiciled there is entitled respect, and more. The burden of under-
mining the verity which the Nevada decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant." 
14 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking 
for the majority said: 
Domicil of the plaintiff • • • is recognized in the Haddock case and elsewhere 
(Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 110.1) as essential in order to give the court juris-
diction .•.. 317 U.S. 287, 297. 
In the second Williams case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: 
Under our system of law, judicial -power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, 
strictly speaking-is founded on domicil. [Citations omitted.] The framers of 
the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, and since 
1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English speaking world has 
questioned it. Domicil implies a nexus between person and place of such 
permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities 
of the utmost significance. The domicil of one spouse within a State gives 
power to that State, we have held, to dissolve a marriage wheresoever con-
tracted. 325 U.S. 226, 229-30. 
15 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942). 
Ø»·²Ñ²´·²» óó íð Ñ¸·± Í¬ò ÔòÖò íïé ïçêç
1969] COA1MENT 317 
between the state and the res, one has selected a nexus that is sub-
jective and dependent upon factors that are susceptible of various 
interpretations. Domicil is dependent upon residence in the state 
coupled with an intent to remain in the state indefinitely or per-
manently.1o A person, therefore, is incapable, at least theoretically, 
of having two domicils at the same time. 
Many state statutes do not speak in terms of domicil as a 
requirement for divorce jurisdiction, but instead require that the 
plaintiff have a residence in the state for a certain length of time.17 
However, these statutes have been interpreted to include the re-
quirement of domicil; thus they involve, in addition to actual physical 
presence in the state for a certain period, an intent to remain in 
the state indefinitely.1s 
Since domicil is, at least in part, dependent on the intent of the 
person involved, it is possible that different courts could make 
different findings as to that intent, both decisions being supported 
by the evidence. The second Williams case, by holding that a second 
state may always inquire into the jurisdictional finding of the first 
state, has opened the door for conflicting findings on the issue of 
domicil, and thus, has left open the possibility that a person might 
be legally divorced in one state and legally married in another state. 
The Supreme Court evidently was aware of the problem raised by 
its decision in the second Williams case, since it held: 
Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the full faith and credit 
clause requires uniformity in the decisions of the courts of 
of different states as to the place of domicil, where the exercise 
of state power is dependent upon domicil within its boundaries.19 
The long awaited confrontation between the states came in 
1962 in the case of Colby v. Colby.20 Husband and wife were both 
domiciliaries of Maryland. The wife traveled to Nevada where, 
after residing for the necessary period, she obtained an ex parte 
divorce.21 Two years later, the husband brought an action in Mary-
land and was awarded a separation, both parties being before the 
16 E.g., Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1950); Campbell v. Campbell, 57 
So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1952); 36 A.L.R.2d 741 (1954). 
1'1 E.g., Omo REv. ConE. ANN. § 3105.03 (Page Supp. 1967). 
18 E.g. Saalfeld v. Saalfeld, 86 Ohio App. 225, 89 N.E.2d 165 (1949); Glassman v. 
Glassman, 75 Ohio App. 47, 60 N.E.2d 716 (1944). 
10 325 u.s. 226, 231 (1945). 
20 369 P.2d 1019 (Nev. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962). 
21 Id. at 1020. 
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court. The defendant wife contended that her Nevada divorce was 
a complete defense to her ex-husband's action. The Maryland Court 
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that, contrary to the 
recital in the Nevada decree, the wife was never domiciled in the 
state, the Nevada court was without jurisdiction, and its decision 
was not entitled to full faith and credit in Maryland.22 The husband 
then went to Nevada and brought an action to vacate the former 
decree of divorce, claiming that the Maryland decree was entitled to 
full faith and credit in Nevada.23 The trial court rendered summary 
judgment for the husband, but the Nevada Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that an ex parte decree is final within the state and full faith 
and credit does not require a state granting a divorce to accept 
another state's determination that it was without jurisdiction. The 
Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari,24 and thus, 
left the parties in the awkward position of having their marital 
status depend upon state lines. 
The husband based his Nevada action on the Supreme Court's 
holding in the case of Sutton v. Leib.25 In that case the plaintiff had 
secured a divorce in Illinois with provisions for alimony until re-
marriage. Soon thereafter, she remarried in Nevada a person who had 
obtained an ex parte divorce from his wife in that state. The former 
wife of the plaintiff's new husband brought suit in New York attack-
ing the Nevada decree. She obtained a judgment that the Nevada 
decree was void. The plaintiff then brought suit in New York to 
have her second marriage annulled. After the New York court 
granted her annulment, she returned to Illinois and sued her first 
husband for back alimony payments, claiming that the New York 
decree determined that she had never been remarried. The court of 
appeals held that the divorce and remarriage were still valid in 
Nevada despite the New York court's decision and therefore, the 
defendant's alimony was discharged.26 On appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court held that Illinois was required to give full faith 
and credit to the judgment of the New York court and the decree 
was conclusive as to the marital status of the parties in all states, 
including Nevada.27 
Thus in the Colby case the husband's contention was that the 
22 Colby v. Colby, 217 Md. 35, 141 A.2d 506 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958). 
28 Colby v. Colby, 369 P .2d 1019, 1022 (Nev. 1962). 
24 371 u.s. 888 (1962). 
25 342 u.s. 402 (1952). 
26 188 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1951). 
21 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 408 (1952). 
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Maryland decree rendered with both parties personally before the 
court was entitled to full faith and credit in Nevada on the basis 
of the holding in Sutton v. Leib.28 The Nevada court, however, dis-
tinguished the Sutton case, on the grounds that in that case the wife 
had never had her marital status before the Nevada courts and that 
the Supreme Court's statement in the Sutton case that Nevada 
would have to grant full faith and credit to the New York decree 
was dictum and not controlling. 29 
III. THE SHERRER AND CoE CASEs 
In 1948 the Supreme Court limited the effect of its holding in 
the second Williams case and held that full faith and credit bars a 
litigant, who has appeared in an action and had full opportunity to 
litigate the jurisdictional issues, from collaterally attacking the deci-
sion in another state when the decision is not susceptible of collateral 
attack in the state where it was rendered.30 In the Sherrer case, the 
parties were both domiciliaries of Massachusetts. The wife left for 
Florida in April, 1944, and in July, 1944, filed for divorce in that 
state, alleging that she was a "bona fide legal resident of the State of 
Florida."31 The husband received notice of the proceeding by mail 
and retained a Florida counsel who entered a general appearance 
for him denying the allegations in the petition, including the al-
legations as to the petitioner's residence. At the hearing, the husband 
appeared personally and testified. The wife introduced evidence to 
establish her Florida residence, and counsel for the husband failed 
to cross examine on that issue or introduce evidence in rebuttal. 
The wife was granted a divorce with the decree specifically finding 
the wife "a bona fide resident of the State of Florida, and that this 
court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in said 
cause .... "32 The husband did not appeal the decree. Immediately 
thereafter, the wife remarried and returned to Massachusetts in 
February, 1945. In June, 1945, the former husband instituted an ac-
tion in Massachusetts to have the Florida divorce decree declared 
void and to have the wife's remarriage declared void. The wife of-
fered the Florida decree as a defense, but the court found that she 
was never domiciled in Florida and granted the relief prayed for by 
the plaintiff. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed on the 
28 342 u.s. 402 (1952). 
20 369 P .2d 1019, 1021 (Nev. 1962). 
so Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). 
Sl Id. at 345. 
s2 Id. at 346. 
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ground that the full faith and credit clause did not preclude the 
trial court from re-examining the finding of domicil made by the 
Florida court.33 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, 
holding that even though the defendant in the divorce action had not 
actually litigated the issue of jurisdiction, the decree was res judicata 
as to him in Florida, and therefore, could not be collaterally attacked 
in another state.34 
In Coe v. Coe, the companion case to Sherrer,3 'J the Supreme 
Court held that where the defendant personally appears and admits 
the allegations as to residence, the same principles apply.36 The 
Sherrer and Coe cases are an extension of the earlier Supreme Court 
case of Davis v. Davis,31 where it was held that a former decree of 
divorce, based upon a finding of domicil after an actual contest 
and litigation of that issue, is entitled to full faith and credit in 
another jurisdiction and is not vulnerable to collateral attack. The 
holding in Sherrer was based upon the idea that a person should 
have only one opportunity to litigate an issue, and if he waives 
that right, he will be forever forclosed from contesting the issue at a 
later time. Actual litigation of the issue is not necessary; the person 
need only have an opportunity to contest. 
The Supreme Court expanded the holding of Sherrer in 1951, in 
the case of Cook v. Cook.38 In that case, the Vermont Supreme Court 
affirmed an annulment of a marriage on the ground that the de-
fendant was still married, even though the defendant had obtained 
a Florida divorce.39 The Vermont court held that the Florida court's 
findings showed neither an appearance by the defendant spouse nor 
personal service made upon him and that therefore, the Vermont 
courts could relitigate the issue of domicil and find that the defen-
dant was not domiciled in Florida at the time the decree was rendered. 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the 
party assailing the Florida decree had not met the burden of proof 
33 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 320 Mass. 351, 69 N.E.2d 801 (1946). 
34 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356 (1948). 
35 334 u.s. 378 (1948). 
36 Here, as in the Sherrer case, the decree of divorce was one which was entered 
after proceedings in which there was participation by both plaintiff and defendant and 
in which both parties were given full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues. 
It was a decree not susceptible to collateral attack in the courts of the state in which 
it was rendered. 
37 305 u.s. 32 (1938). 
38 342 u.s. 126 (1951). 
39 Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A.2d 593 (1950). 
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arising from the presumption of jurisdiction and that the Vermont 
court must make an actual finding on the issue as to whether the 
absent spouse personally appeared or was personally served in 
Florida. The Court went on to hold that the Vermont court could 
not rely merely on a statement that the Florida record showed no 
service or appearance by the spouse in the Florida proceeding. 
The Sherrer case precluded the spouse, who personally appeared 
in the divorce proceedings, from relitigating the issue of domicil, if 
barred by the law of the divorcing state. Later this rule was extended 
by the Supreme Court to preclude attack by one not in privity with 
the spouses. In johnson v. Jl.1uelberger,40 the court held that when 
the law of the divorcing state prevents a child from attacking a 
divorce decree which the parent could not attack, that child cannot 
collaterally attack the decree in another state consistently with the 
principle of full faith and credit. 
The question immediately arises as to what constitutes an 
appearance in the divorce proceeding. Clearly, an actual litigation 
of the domicil issue will prevent collateral attack.41 It also appears 
clear that when the defendant is personally served within the 
jurisdiction, but makes no appearance, the decree is nonetheless 
entitled to full faith and credit.42 The Supreme Court has yet to 
decide a case where the defendant entered an appearance in the 
proceeding without any participation, but a broad reading of the 
Sherrer case would indicate that the critical question to be decided 
is whether there was opportunity to litigate, and any authorized 
appearance will prevent subsequent attack. 
The holding in the Sherrer case also raises the very real pos· 
sibility of collusion on the part of the spouses to obtain a divorce 
forever binding in all states. Parties residing in a state with limited 
grounds for divorce can travel to a state with more liberal grounds 
and if the court does not question the issue of domicil, obtain a 
divorce that should be binding on everyone. It should be clear that 
a party who appeared in the proceeding or was personally served 
within the jurisdiction of the state rendering the divorce decree 
cannot avoid the rule of Sherrer by simply alleging fraud by the 
other party in establishing the requirement of domicil. Othenvise, 
40 340 u.s. 581 (1951). 
41 E.g., Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Keller v. Keller, 212 S.W .2d 789 (Mo. 
1948). 
42 Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); 
In re Wynne's Estate, 194 Misc. 459, 85 N.Y .S.2d 743 (1948). 
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the holding in Sherrer would be of no value, since a party could 
always allege fraud.43 However, the courts of at least one state have 
held that Sherrer does not prevent subsequent collateral attack on 
the issue of domicil even though both parties were before the court 
when it is shown that there was active fraud on the part of both 
parties in obtaining the divorce.44 In Staedler v. Staedler45 the 
parties entered into a separation agreement which contained, among 
other items, an agreement by the wife to enter an appearance in 
any divorce proceeding instituted by the husband. Also, the agree· 
ment specified that if the wife opposed the divorce, the property 
settlement would be void. The husband left the state and filed for 
divorce in Florida. Before instituting the action, the husband sent 
to the wife in New Jersey an authorization for her to sign, agreeing 
to hire a Florida attorney to represent her in the action. She signed 
the authorization and returned it to her husband. The Florida at· 
torney :filed an answer for the wife and admitted, among other 
things, the husband's allegations as to residence in Florida. The 
Florida court rendered a decree of divorce in favor of the husband. 
The husband returned to New Jersey and subsequently defaulted 
on the terms of the original separation agreement. The wife in· 
stituted a suit in New Jersey to have the Florida decree set aside 
and to grant a divorce in her favor. The trial court found that the 
husband never intended and did not establish a bona fide domicil 
in Florida and therefore that decree was void. The court proceeded 
to grant a divorce to the wife. The trial judge held that the Sherrer 
case did not require that a decree be given full faith and credit where 
the plaintiff acknowledged that it was obtained by fraud. The 
decision went on to hold that Florida had no interest which would 
be infringed by a refusal to recognize a decree obtained by fraud by 
persons not domiciliaries of Florida. The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey affirmed, stating: 
We have carefully considered these cases [Sherrer and Coe] 
and we do not believe that the full faith and credit clause of the 
Federal Constitution was ever intended to be used as a shield 
for or to give validity to the type of contract here under con· 
sideration or to approve the acts performed pursuant thereto in 
43 Heuer v. Heuer, 33 Cal.2d 268, 201 P .2d 385 {1949). 
44 Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951); Chirelstein v. Chirelstein, 
8 N.J. Super. 504, 73 A.2d 680 (1950), modified on other grounds, 12 N.J. Super. 468, 
79 A.2d 884 (1951). 
45 6 N.J. 380, 78 A.2d 896 (1951). 
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cases where the ultimate purpose was to commit a fraud upon 
the jurisdiction of a court of one of the several sovereign states.46 
323 
It is interesting to note that the New Jersey court did not even 
consider the question of the decree's validity in Florida against a 
collateral attack on the same grounds, even though the Sherrer case 
rested in part of the principle of res judicata in the state rendering 
the decree. 
In Donnell v. Howell47 the North Carolina Supreme Court 
was faced with a similar set of circumstances involving an Alabama 
divorce. The decision declared the divorce void despite the fact that 
the plaintiff had admitted in the divorce proceeding that his wife 
had been an Alabama resident for the requisite length of time. The 
North Carolina court discussed the validity of the decree in Alabama 
and concluded that the Alabama courts would also declare the 
decree void under the same facts and therefore, since the parties 
were not precluded from attacking the decree in Alabama by 
principles of res judicata, the North Carolina courts could declare 
the decree void. 48 One of the cases relied on by the North Carolina 
court in reaching that conclusion was a case in which the Alabama 
Supreme Court said the principle of res judicata was applicable to 
the jurisdictional findings but that the parties had waived that 
objection by failing to raise it.49 
The District of Columbia judiciary have fallen into the same 
trap as did the North Carolina court. In Gherardi de Parata v. 
Gherardi de Parata50 both spouses were domiciled in the District of 
Columbia. The defendant procured the wife's signature on a piece 
of paper entitled "Acceptance of Service of Process and Answer 
and Waiver of Respondent," with the waiver also stating the hus· 
band was a bona fide resident of Alabama. The husband went to 
Alabama for five hours during which period he instituted proceed· 
ings for divorce. The Alabama court granted the divorce and later 
the wife instituted an action in the Municipal Court of the District 
of Columbia to affirm the marriage and declare void the Alabama 
divorce which was procured by fraud on the issue of jurisdiction. 
The husband defended on the ground that since both parties had 
participated in the Alabama proceedings, the decree was entitled to 
46 Id. at 391, 78 A.2d at 901. 
47 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962). 
48 Id. at 187, 125 S.E.2d at 454. 
49 Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961). 
M 179 A.2d 723 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962). 
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full faith and credit. The trial court held for the husband, finding 
that the wife had authorized an Alabama attorney to file the waiver 
of service of process and therefore, the decree was res judicata as to 
the issues. The Municipal Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
the wife had not sufficently participated in the action to confer 
jurisdiction on the Alabama courts, and also, since Alabama courts 
would have re-examined the jurisdictional question and since full 
faith and credit requires that only the same effect be given a judg-
ment rendered in another state as that state itself would give, the 
courts of the District of Columbia would likewise re-examine the 
jurisdictional findings. 
Therefore, assuming Alabama courts would have applied the 
principle of res judicata, if raised by one of the parties, 51 the decision 
of the District of Columbia court clearly violates the full faith and 
credit requirement as enunciated in the Sherrer case. 
These cases clearly show that the ramifications of the Sherrer 
decision are as uncertain as the decisions in the two Williams cases. 
Yet to be resolved are the questions of what is sufficent to con-
stitute an appearance so as to afford an opportunity to litigate the 
jurisdictional issue; what is the effect of collusion by both parties 
in obtaining the divorce; and what is sufficent participation by one 
party as to amount to active fraud in obtaining the decree. Does 
the mere signing of a waiver of service of process amount to sufficient 
participation as to invoke the Sherrer rule? If not, does authoriza-
tion of an attorney to enter an appearance and admit the allegations 
of the petition constitute fraud on the part of both parties and 
enable a subsequent collateral attack in another jurisdiction as was 
allowed in the Staedler case? At least one author has suggested that 
the Sherrer decision and the subsequent cases expanding Sherrer 
should be overruled, since to forbid a collateral attack on a foreign 
divorce uses the full faith an4 credit clause to destroy its own 
principle that each state is entitled to manage its own affairs.52 
It is submitted that the weakness and uncertainty caused by 
the Sherrer decision are a result of the insistence on the part of the 
Supreme Court to keep domicil of one of the parties as a necessary 
factor in order to establish a jurisdictional foundation. The un-
certainty of the finding of domicil necessarily opens up a possibility 
of a different finding on that issue on collateral attack, and in order 
51 Id. 
52 Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 
34 U. Cmc. L. REv. 26, 56 (1966). 
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to establish some finality to divorce decrees, the Sherrer decision is 
a necessary evil. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES 
As pointed out above, the beginning point of all the Supreme 
Court's holdings in this area has been that domicil of one of the 
parties establishes the jurisdictional basis upon which a state can 
dissolve the marital status. There are alternatives to domicil, such 
as physical presence or residence which would provide the jurisdic-
tional foundation required by the due process clause and also 
eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the use of domicil. The 
alternatives would create a basis to support the interest of the state 
in protecting its residents against migratory ex parte divorces and 
yet provide a degree of certainty to divorces, a vital necessity in an 
area involving the legitimacy of children and the devolution of 
estates. Even if the Supreme Court maintains its position that 
domicil is a constitutional requirement, there exists an alternative 
in the form advanced by the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act. 53 
A. The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act 
The Uniform Act was adopted by the N a tiona! Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the American Bar Association 
in 1948, not to do away with domicil as a jurisdictional requirement 
but to discourage the migratory divorce.54 Thus far, the act has been 
adopted in only ten states. 55 The provisions of the act are as follows: 
§ I. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another 
jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state, if both 
parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time 
the proceedings for the divorce was commenced. 
§ 2. Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bonds of 
matrimony in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this 
state ·within t1velve months prior to the commencement of the 
proceedings therefore, and resumed residence in this state within 
eighteen months after the date of his departure therefrom, or (b) 
at all times after his departure from this state and until his 
return maintains a place of residence within the state, shall be 
prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state 
when the divorce proceeding was commenced. 
53 9A U.L.A. 462 (1957). 
G4 Note, 16 HAsTINGs L.J. 121, 123 (1964). 
5G California, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North 
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. The provision 
has since been repealed in Louisiana. Id. at 124. 
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The effect of the first section is to recognize the rule that in 
order for a state to terminate the marital status, one of the parties 
must be domiciled within its borders. Section two of the act was 
designed to add an element of certainty to the finding of domicil, 
and to change the burden of proof if certain residence requirements 
are not met and to make the divorce prima facie invalid. Whether 
the later section conflicts with the holdings of the Supreme Court in 
the second Williams case and subsequent cases would not seem to 
be open to doubt. Consider the following language taken from the 
second Williams case: "The burden of undermining the verity 
which the Nevada decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant."56 
The act was most recently adopted in New York and has been 
critized as raising serious due process problems, since a statutory 
presumption must have a rational connection between the fact 
proved and the ultimate fact presumed-in this case, lack of 
domicil. 57 The usual interpretation of the meaning of domicil has 
been that a person can establish a new domicil overnight, if he has 
the proper intent.5s 
The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act does not solve all of 
the problems raised by the Williams cases and is subject to con-
stitutional attack. The effect of the law in at least one jurisdiction 
has been minimal.59 But the act does attempt to reduce the un-
certainty caused by the use of domicil as providing the jurisdictional 
basis for divorce. If applied by the courts, it would allow the parties 
to assess their position before fleeing to another jurisdiction to 
obtain a divorce. 
B. Elimination of the Domicil Requirement 
By far the most useful solution to the problems of uncertainty 
would be the complete elimination of domicil as the basis for divorce 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, although expressly holding many 
times that the state of domicil has exclusive power to terminate the 
marital status,60 has yet to face squarely a case in which the state law 
has not required domicil of one of the parties in order to grant a 
divorce. However, it would seem to be a fairly safe assumption, at 
least at the time of the first Williams case, that the Supreme Court 
56 325 u.s. 226, 233-34. 
57 Note, 67 CoL. L. REv. 1320 (1967); Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), 
vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). 
58 24 AM. JuR. 2n, Divorce and Separation, § 248 (1966). 
59 Note, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 121 (1964). 
60 E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). 
Ø»·²Ñ²´·²» óó íð Ñ¸·± Í¬ò ÔòÖò íîé ïçêç
1969] COM}.!ENT 327 
was using domicil in the constitutional sense as providing the juris-
dictional basis to satisfy the due process clause and holding that full 
faith and credit requires recognition of decrees meeting these 
jurisdictional due process requirements. Nevertheless, it is still hard 
to interpret the Constitution as requiring domicil rather than some 
other factor as the nexus to give a state power to dissolve a marriage. 
Factors such as physical presence, residence, location of the celebra-
tion of the marriage, and location of the place where the matrimonial 
offense occurred might be used to provide the nexus. 
The use of physical presence as providing the nexus would 
have the advantage of certainty that is lacking with the use of 
domicil, and a collateral attack on physical presence would be 
next to impossible. It has been suggested by one author that the use 
of physical presence as a basis for jurisdiction can be equated with 
the situation involving the situs of a debt where it was once held that 
the situs of a debt was the domicil of the debtor, but now is con-
sidered, for purposes of garnishment, to be where the debtor may 
be found.61 
Mere residence in the jurisdiction might also be used as the 
necessary nexus between the state and the marital status and like 
physical presence, would eliminate. the necessity of inquiring into 
the plaintiff's mental status to establish the jurisdiction. The states 
have an interest in the persons residing within their borders without 
regard to their state of mind and often, especially in resort areas, a 
person will reside in that state for a longer period of time during 
the year than in his state of domicil. 
The state where the marriage was celebrated also might have 
sufficient interest in the marital status to provide a basis for assertion 
of jurisdiction to terminate the marriage. It is firmly established that 
the validity of a marriage is to be decided by the law of the place 
where it was celebrated.62 Why then should not that state also have 
a sufficient interest to terminate the marriage? However, as has been 
pointed out, the state of celebration is often a state where the parties 
have only minimal contacts; this might be insufficient to support 
jurisdiction. 63 
In tort law, the place where the alleged offense occurred generally 
61 Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possi-
ble Changes, 9 VAND. L. REv. 1, 19 (1955). 
62 H. GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 228 (4th ed. Scoles 1964). 
63 Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possi-
ble Changes, 9 VAND. L. REv. I, 15 (1955). 
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supplies the choice of law for purposes of conflict of laws, as well as 
providing the requisite interest to support jurisdiction of the subject 
matter.64 Divorce law could be analogized to the tort situation, and 
thus the state wherein the matrimonial offense occurred would have 
sufficient interest to dissolve the marriage. But unlike physical 
presence, residence, and location of the state where the marriage was 
celebrated, the locus delecti is often hard to pinpoint and might 
prove as troublesome as the use of domicil.6;; Unlike the tort situa-
tion, the rule of reference and the rule of jurisdiction are the same 
in divorce cases almost without exception. Domicil provides both 
the basis for jurisdiction and the rule of reference as to what law 
will be applied. This situation has led many to believe that the 
whole problem of migratory divorces would be solved, not by revis-
ing the jurisdiction standards, but simply through a correct choice 
of law on the part of the forum state.66 Judge Hastie, in his strong 
dissent in Alton v. Alton,67 suggested that due process does not 
prevent the adjudication of a divorce action in any state when the 
court has personal jurisdiction over both parties and the only ques-
tion for the court to decide is whether the substantive law of the 
forum can properly be applied. 
The Alton case involved the constitutionality of a Virgin Islands 
statute which provided in divorce actions (I) that si.">: weeks residence 
would be prima facie evidence of domicil and (2) that where the 
defendant was personally served within the jurisdiction or personally 
appeared in the proceedings, the court would have jurisdiction to 
grant the divorce without regard to domicil. The plaintiff in Alton, 
after residing in the Islands for six weeks, filed suit for divorce and 
the defendant entered a general appearance. The trial judge asked 
the plaintiff for further proof on the question of domicil. The 
plaintiff offered no further proof, and the action was dismissed. The 
court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the statute 
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The majority 
concluded that domicil was the basis for assertion of divorce juris-
diction; therefore, it would be a violation of due process for one state 
to alter the marital status between parties domiciled elsewhere. 
64 H. GooDRICH, CoNFUCT OF LAws 165 (4th ed. Scoles 1964). 
65 Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possi-
ble Changes, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21 (1955). 
66 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion); Currie, 
Suitcase Divorces in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CHic. L. 
R.Ev. 26, 48 (1966). 
67 207 F.2d 667, 684 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion). 
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The court also declared invalid the first part of the statute's presump-
tion of domicil after six weeks, finding no reasonable relationship 
between the fact presumed and the fact creating the presumption. 
Judge Hastie disagreed with the majority in both instances, con-
cluding that the domicil requirement was a judge-made rule without 
constitutional sanction, in addition to being a troublesome standard 
that often works unfairly and causes serious social problems.68 
Unfortunately, by the time Alton reached the Supreme Court 
the parties had procured a divorce in their home state, and the 
Court dismissed the question as moot. 69 However, in a later case 
involving the same statute, the court of appeals again declared the 
statute unconstitutional on the basis of its decision in Alton,7° and 
this time the Supreme Court heard the cases on the merits. In a 
five-three decision, it held the statute invalid but did not pass on the 
due process question. Instead, the Court said the statute went beyond 
the statutory authority delegated by Congress to the Virgin Islands 
Legislature in that it did not deal with a subject "of local application" 
but was designed to attract divorce seekers.71 The Virgin Islands 
Legislature has since amended its law, and now the plaintiff must 
be domiciled therein and have resided in the Islands for at least six 
weeks prior to commencement of the action.72 
A proper application of choice of law in the divorce field would 
eliminate many of the objections that supporters of the domiciliary 
requirement advance to perpetuate their beliefs. Jurisdiction based 
on personal service or personal appearance by the defendant, coupled 
with an appropriate choice of law, would serve to protect the interest 
of the state of matrimonial domicil. Thus in the Alton case if it 
appeared the parties were domiciled in Connecticut at the time of 
the action and the alleged misconduct took place in the matrimonial 
domicil state, then the Virgin Islands court, lacking connection with 
the subject matter of the action, would be forced to apply the 
divorce law of Connecticut. 73 
Another possible solution to the problem, closely allied to a 
proper choice of law, is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. A 
court, when called upon to exercise jurisdiction over the domestic 
problems of persons immigrating from distant states, would exercise 
68 Id. 
69 Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). 
70 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 214 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1954). 
71 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. I (1955). 
72 V.I. STAT • .ANN. tit. 16, § 106. 
73 Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 684 (3d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion). 
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its discretion and decline or assume jurisdiction according to its 
assessment of whether the state has a legitimate concern in the 
marital status in question. But the Supreme Court has limited the 
use of the doctrine and has placed the burden on the defendant to 
establish a strong case for dismissal. Unless he so does, the plaintiff's 
choice of forum is not to be disturbed.74 This doctrine has received 
little application in the field of divorce other than in the District of 
Columbia,75 where the judiciary has applied the doctrine where it 
found that no property rights or other public interests were affected 
in the forum state,76 when the crowded conditions of the court's 
docket required prime consideration be given parties who of neces-
sity were forced to use local courts, 77 or when the court found that 
the defendant would be amenable to service of process in another 
jurisdiction where the action could have been prosecuted in a more 
expeditious manner.7s 
V. CoNCLUSION 
In the field of divorce law, it is very possible for a state to be-
come overly concerned with the necessity of protecting its residents 
from migratory ex parte divorces procured by one of the spouses. 
The result of the overzealous concern is that while eliminating one 
evil, it has created a more serious problem that stril<.es at the founda-
tion of familial relationships. Persons are legally married in one 
state, while they are as legally divorced in another. Children are 
legitimate in one state, yet illegitimate under the laws of another. 
Persons are legally married in one state, yet guilty of bigamous co-
habitation in another. A marriage is annulled in one state yet solem-
nized forever in another state. 
A solution to the problem will not be possible until one of 
two changes occur: (I) the Supreme Court eliminates completely the 
necessity of founding jurisdiction on a finding that one of the spouses 
is domiciled in state and substitutes in its place a relationship that 
74 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking 
for the majority said: 
In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it 
presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; 
the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them. 
Id. at 506·507. 
75 Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 545 (1966). 
76 Clark v. Clark, 144 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mun. App. 1958). 
77 Gill v. Gill, 193 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
78 Simons v. Simons, 187 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951). 
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once shown is virtually impossible to impeach on collateral attack; 
or (2) the Supreme Court decides that once a judgment of one state 
has been successfully attacked in a sister state for lack of jurisdiction, 
the original judgment is void everywhere, including the state origin-
ally rendering the decree. 
The first alternative presents the best possible solution, and 
many variations are possible, including a proper choice of law by the 
state rendering the decree. The statute of the Virgin Islands, de-
clared unconstitutional in Alton, represents one variation that was 
attempted. The second alternative, while ~not eliminating the un-
certainty involved in securing an ex parte migratory divorce, none-
theless would eliminate the difference in legal relationships which 
are possible under the present holding in the second Williams case. 
The first move must be on the part of the state legislatures, for 
the Supreme Court can rule only if the question is presented. A 
superficial examination of the present status of interstate recogni-
tion of divorce decrees should satisfy state legislatures that the solu-
tion rests in their hands to protect their citizens from the over~pro­
tection they and the courts have been giving in the past. 
Richard A. Williamson 
